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THE NDAA, AUMF, AND CITIZENS DETAINED
AWAY FROM THE THEATER OF WAR:
SOUNDING A CLARION CALL FOR A CLEAR
STATEMENT RULE
Diana Cho∗
In the armed conflict resulting from the September 11 attacks, the
executive authority to order the indefinite detention of citizens captured
away from the theater of war is an issue of foreign and domestic
significance. The relevant law of armed conflict provisions relevant to
conflicts that are international or non-international in nature, however,
do not fully address this issue. Congress also intentionally left the
question of administrative orders of citizen detainment unresolved in a
controversial provision of the 2012 version of the annually-enacted
National Defense Authorization Act. While plaintiffs in Hedges v.
Obama sought to challenge the enforceability of NDAA’s section 1021
on the basis that it permitted indefinite detention of citizens who are far
removed from the theater of war, they were denied relief on the basis of
standing and the issue continues to remain undecided. A revision of the
language of section 1021, such as one suggested in this Article, might
sufficiently quell the fears raised by the Hedges plaintiffs. Yet given that
the recent versions of the NDAA have left this provision intact, this
Article recommends applying a clear statement rule to section 1021 to
construe that provision as not permitting the indefinite detention of
citizens captured away from the theater of war.

∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Sociology,
University of Texas, Austin, 2011. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor David
Glazier for his patience and invaluable guidance in this endeavor. I am forever indebted to the
many law school colleagues, particularly Cameron Bell and Andrew Beshai, who sacrificed much
time and energy to see this Article to fruition. Finally, I am most grateful for the steadfast support
and encouragement from my older sister, who has always believed in me.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the conflict formerly known as the “war on terror” lingers on
into its thirteenth year, the issue regarding indefinite detention of
American citizens captured on American soil who are alleged to be
enemy combatants remains unresolved.1 The Bush administration
characterized the conflict as a worldwide war against all terrorist
forces responsible for 9/112 and claimed broad authority under the
executive’s Article II war powers to validate the substandard
treatment of unlawful “enemy combatants,” effectively eschewing
law of armed conflict (LOAC) standards.3 While the American
people and the global community stood behind the decision to use
military force against those responsible for 9/11,4 support for the
“war on terror” quickly developed into strident criticism of President
Bush’s wartime policies.5
In its second decade the conflict evolved from a full-scale war
effort to scattered “overseas contingency operations” as associations
to the forces behind the World Trade Centers and Pentagon attacks
weaken and become increasingly attenuated.6 President Obama
1. See infra Part III; Diane Webber, Preventive Detention in the Law of Armed Conflict:
Throwing Away the Key?, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 167 (2012).
2. Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11,
2001); Memorandum from George W. Bush to the White House (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush
Memorandum], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_e
d.pdf.
3. Several of President Bush’s closest advisors warned that declaring the Geneva
Conventions inapplicable to the conflict would reverse a century of reliance on international
treaties, undermine protections of American soldiers involved in the conflict, and garner
international criticism. See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State to Counsel to
President George W. Bush (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEB
B/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf; Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, to
Counsel to the President (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/polit
ics/20040608_DOC.pdf; see infra Part II.A.
4. See generally JENNIFER L. MEROLLA & ELIZABETH J. ZECHMEISTER, DEMOCRACY AT
RISK: HOW TERRORIST THREATS AFFECT THE PUBLIC 131, 140 (2009) (discussing increased
public support for political authority figures that took a hardline approach on terrorism); Jack M.
Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 568–70 (2002).
5. At Home and Abroad, Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ Faces Mounting Criticism, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 30, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1230-03.htm; see
G. Scott Morgan et al., The Expulsion from Disneyland: The Social Psychological Impact of 9/11,
66 AM. PSYCHOL. 447, 450 (2011).
6. See Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the “War on Terrorism”: Normalizing the
Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 42–46 (2012); Scott Wilson & Al
Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html.
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quickly abandoned the heavy-handed rhetoric of his predecessor,
stressing that the laws of war inform his wartime policies and that the
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF)7 statutorily
authorizes his war powers.8 Indeed, in his 2014 State of the Union
address, President Obama issued optimistic statements regarding the
end of the current conflict against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.9 Yet try
as he might to divorce himself from President Bush’s wartime
agenda, President Obama has failed to make good on his promise to
permanently shutter Guantánamo’s doors and has actually ramped up
the use of drone strikes to terminate suspected terrorist adversaries.10
So it comes as no surprise that Congress, ten years after 9/11,
would find itself at an impasse over section 1021, a provision in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
(NDAA)11 that could expand or limit the president’s detention
7. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)); Letter to
Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployments of United States Combat-Equipped Armed
Forces, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Dec. 13, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/DCPD-201300853/pdf/DCPD-201300853.pdf.
8. There is a notable difference between being “informed” by the laws of war, and adhering
to the laws of war. This Article does not address the reasons and ramifications related to President
Obama’s reluctance to fully align his wartime policies with international law of war principles.
See Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, 1 PUB. PAPERS 689, 694–95
(May 21, 2009); Benjamin Wittes, Continuity and Change: Towards a Synthesis, LAWFARE
(Dec. 17, 2010, 9:53 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/continuity-and-change-towardsa-synthesis/#.Uv5fEf2C5Hw.
9. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2014 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 7 (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD
-201400050/pdf/DCPD-201400050.pdf. Given that the “war on terror” terminology lacks legal
precision, this Article will refer to the current conflict as the conflict against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban.
10. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203 (2009); Michael Price, Guantanamo Update,
CHAMPION, Nov. 2009, at 55; David Wagner, Obama’s Failed Promise to Close Gitmo: A
Timeline, ATLANTIC WIRE (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/01/
obama-closing-guantanamo-timeline/61509; Wittes, supra note 8.
11. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011) [hereinafter NDAA]. The text section 1021 of
the NDAA is as follows:
Sec. 1021. AFFIRMATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES TO DETAIN COVERED PERSONS PURSUANT TO THE
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Congress affirms that the authority of the President to use all
necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for the Armed Forces
of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending
disposition under the law of war.
(b) COVERED PERSONS.—A covered person under this section is any person as
follows:
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks. (2) A
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authority under the AUMF.12 The result of the senators’ standoff
over section 1021 of the NDAA was a compromise that essentially
purported to do nothing new to executive detention authority
concerning American citizens.13 However, section 1021 incorporates
language absent from the AUMF that some argue subjects citizens as
well as noncitizens with trivial ties to terrorists to indefinite detention
without due process, an issue raised by the group of plaintiffs in a
recent Second Circuit case, Hedges v. Obama.14 And while President
Obama has made clear he will not be interpreting the NDAA to

person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.
(c) DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.—The disposition of a person under the
law of war as described in subsection (a) may include the following:
(1) Detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the hostilities
authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
(2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as amended by the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (title XVIII of Public Law 111–84)).
(3) Transfer for trial by an alternative court or competent tribunal having lawful
jurisdiction.
(4) Transfer to the custody or control of the person’s country of origin, any other
foreign country, or any other foreign entity.
(d) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the
authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
(e) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law
or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens
of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United
States.
12. See 157 CONG. REC. S7,941 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011) (statement of Sen. Paul) (“We are
talking about American citizens who could be taken from the United States and sent to a camp at
Guantánamo Bay and held indefinitely.”); id. at S7,945 (statement of Sen. Udall) (“The
provisions authorize the indefinite military detention of American citizens who are suspected of
involvement in terrorism—even those captured here in our own country . . . .”); id. at S7,950
(statement of Sen. Webb) (“I am . . . very concerned about the notion of the protection of our own
citizens and our legal residents from military action inside our own country.”); id. at S7,953
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (“As currently written, the language in this bill would authorize the
military to indefinitely detain individuals—including U.S. citizens—without charge or trial. I am
fundamentally opposed to indefinite detention, and certainly when the detainee is a U.S. citizen
held without charge.”).
13. NDAA, supra note 11, § 1021(e); see 157 CONG. REC. S8,157 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011)
(amendment proposed by Sen. Feinstein) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect
existing law or authorities, relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident
aliens of the United States or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United
States.”).
14. 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013).
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authorize indefinite detention of citizens,15 there is no guarantee that
his presidency will outlast the current conflict.
Accordingly, given that the “war on terror” has already left an
indelible mark upon the American psyche,16 it is a worthwhile
endeavor to address the unanswered question of citizen detention
raised by this conflict in preparation for similar challenges that may
emerge during other conflicts. Recognizing that indefinite detention
of U.S. citizens is not a novel concept to the American people, but in
fact has previously occurred in this nation’s history as a fear-driven
reaction to an unfamiliar, foreign enemy is crucial to preventing
abuses of due process rights in the future.17 The undeniably domestic
nature and impact of citizen detention implicates separation of
powers concerns as threats that emerge within the United States by
terrorist actors warrant prompt executive action, with or without
legislative support. Therefore, an informed judiciary is paramount to
keeping the executive and legislative branches from perpetuating
politically advantageous wartime policies that may not withstand
judicial scrutiny.18
This Article acknowledges that the term unlawful “enemy
combatant” is not a formal designation under the LOAC.19 As such,
this Article refers to enemy threats as “terrorist adversaries” or
simply “combatants” and argues that while LOAC provisions
governing international and non-international armed conflicts
probably permit the president to indefinitely detain a properly
designated terrorist adversary, an analysis of the president’s foreign
affairs power under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer20

15. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 2 (Dec. 31, 2011).
16. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses To Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 122 YALE L.J. 1011, 1038–41 (2003); David Sirota, The Long-Term Legacy of
9/11, SALON (July 26, 2011, 10:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/07/26/9_11_terrorism_
legacy; see, e.g., Mark A. Schuster et al., A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the
September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks, 345 N. ENGL. J. MED 1507 (2001) (analyzing the mental
health effects of 9/11 upon American adults revealing at least 90 percent experienced some stress
symptom from the attacks).
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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would support a finding that this executive detention authority does
not extend to U.S. citizens captured on U.S. soil.
Therefore, this Article suggests that courts adjudicating the
detention of U.S. citizens apply a clear statement rule to section 1021
of the 2012 version of the NDAA to require an express act of
Congress permitting the indefinite detention of alleged citizen
terrorist adversaries. Courts may then determine what due process is
afforded to the alleged terrorist adversary by applying the
well-known Mathews v. Eldridge21 balancing test, taking into
account the alleged terrorist adversary’s status as an American
citizen and the heightened constitutional protections that individuals
gain by virtue of capture or arrest on American soil.22 Alternatively,
this Article proposes a two-fold revision of NDAA’s section
1021: (1) an express prohibition of indefinite detainment of U.S.
citizens captured domestically and (2) authorization to detain any
other person arrested or detained in the United States only to the
extent permissible under existing law and authorities.
Part II provides background information on the now-rejected
“enemy combatant” terminology and discusses the scope and limits
of the president’s constitutional and statutory authority to detain
individuals in international and non-international armed conflicts.
Part III discusses cases involving citizens deemed terrorist
adversaries in the current conflict and the lack of consistency in the
courts regarding the executive’s detention authority over citizens
arrested away from the theater of war.
Part IV argues that the Non-Detention Act passed in the early
1970s in response to the Cold War that prohibited citizen detention
should be construed as prohibiting both military and non-military
detention of citizens without clear congressional authorization to the
contrary.23 Part IV asserts that the AUMF and NDAA do not
provide the congressional authorization necessary to trump the
Non-Detention Act. Therefore, under the Youngstown framework,
the president is likely within the zone where his actions are in
contravention to congressional will and even his expansive plenary

21. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
22. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–33 (2004).
23. Non-Detention Act, Pub. L. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
(2006)).
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foreign affairs powers are diminished to some extent.24 Thus, any
executive decision to detain a citizen without trial would be subject
to searching judicial scrutiny.
Part V proposes that when a U.S. citizen detained on U.S. soil is
alleged to be a terrorist adversary but disputes that designation,
courts should apply a clear statement rule to the AUMF and NDAA,
which would allow courts to interpret the controversial section 1021
of the 2012 NDAA in ways that ensure due process protections are
afforded to American citizens. Within these narrow circumstances,
the president’s war powers under the Constitution, the AUMF, the
NDAA, and the LOAC are justifiably balanced and limited by
judicial backstops that preserve fundamental civil liberties at home.
II. SCOPE OF THE PRESIDENT’S DETENTION AUTHORITY UNDER THE
LOAC, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE AUMF AND NDAA
Armed conflicts are generally categorized as either international
or non-international in nature.25 International armed conflicts (IACs)
are those conflicts that arise between nation states whereas
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) occur in the territory of a
single sovereign nation between a state and a non-state actor.26 Thus,
by definition, a NIAC typically refers to an internal civil war in
which the national government may treat members of the insurgent
group not as belligerents, but as criminals subject to the nation’s laws
and punitive treatment.27 As a result, the combatant designation
generally does not apply in NIACs but does apply in IACs to
describe enemy belligerents. Nonetheless, under the separate LOAC
provisions that govern IACs and NIACs, respectively, a sovereign is
empowered to detain properly designated threats to the nation’s
security.28
A. The Rise and Fall of the “Enemy Combatant”
Status in the Present Armed Conflict
An issue that potentially incited greater confusion and
controversy than the characterization of the conflict was the Bush
24. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
25. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 991 (2009).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See infra Part II.B.
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administration’s use of a novel designation of terrorist adversaries as
“enemy combatants.”29 This label eschewed the traditional
dichotomous terminology of participants in an IAC as combatants or
civilians.30
The notion of unlawful combatancy emerged in the World War
II case Ex parte Quirin.31 In Quirin, the Supreme Court held that a
group of Nazi soldiers could be tried as unlawful belligerents by a
military commission rather than by a jury, because they had “shed
their uniforms intending to engage in acts of military sabotage.”32
The Court also denied the habeas petitions of the German saboteurs
who held American citizenship, reasoning that “[c]itizenship in the
United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve [the]m from
the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in
violation of the law of war.”33 Unlawful combatancy has historically
been invoked to describe certain participants in armed conflicts such
as spies who “fail[] to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population during attacks” and thus cannot shroud themselves within
combatant immunity nor shield themselves from administrative
detention by a belligerent party without access to courts or lawyers.34
The Bush administration relied on this idea of unlawful “enemy
combatants” to label al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters as such.
Justice Department memos issued by the Bush administration
justified the classification of terrorist combatants associated with
al-Qaeda and the Taliban as unlawful “enemy combatants.”35
Focusing on the fact that Taliban and al-Qaeda militants do not wear
uniforms with a distinguishable emblem or openly bear arms while
carrying out acts of terror in contravention to the laws of war,
President Bush’s wartime administration determined that al-Qaeda
29. Memorandum for Daniel J. Bryant, Ass’t Att’y Gen., from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y
Gen. (June 27, 2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/detention.pdf; Memorandum
for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen. (Jan. 9,
2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf.
30. Glazier, supra note 25, at 996–1006.
31. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
32. Id. at 2; Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 715 (2d Cir. 2003).
33. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37–38.
34. Glazier, supra note 25, at 1011–12.
35. See Memorandum for Daniel J. Bryant, Ass’t Att’y Gen., from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t
Att’y Gen. (June 27, 2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/detention.pdf;
Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y
Gen. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01
.09.pdf.
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and the Taliban do not conform to the requirements of lawful
combatancy set forth in the Hague Regulations of 1907.36 Based on
this assessment, the government maintained the position that
classifying detainees as “enemy combatants” sanctioned deprivation
of certain international legal protections.37 Under the mantle of
inherent constitutional power as commander-in-chief and ostensibly
unrestricted by the LOAC forbidding the cruel or degrading
treatment of detainees, President Bush initiated a massive detention
campaign to transport alleged “enemy combatants” to Guantánamo
Bay to endure interrogation techniques that often bordered on
torture.38
Indeed, the few terrorist actors who orchestrated the events of
September 11 might aptly be named unlawful combatants in the “war
on terror,” but extending that definition to all of the forces in
Afghanistan without regard for a more nuanced determination of
lawful combatant status appears to have been an excessive use of
wartime authority.39 In light of the far-reaching protections in Article
75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for
“persons who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the
Conventions,”40 the Bush administration’s approach to treat “enemy
combatants” as beyond the reach of the LOAC appears to be a failed
attempt to strip detainees of rights guaranteed under the LOAC
and domestic law.41 Indeed, as discussed below, the LOAC
36. Lawful combatancy covers any person involved in a militia or volunteer corps who
“(1) is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) has a fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) carries arms openly; and (4) conducts their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.” Second Hague Peace Conference Convention
Regarding the Laws of and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens
(3d) 461; Glazier, supra note 25, at 998–1001, 1007. See Memorandum from Alberto R.
Gonzales, Legal Counsel, for President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf.
37. Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies to spies, saboteurs, and other
unlawful combatants, states that “such persons shall . . . be treated with humanity and, in case of
trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present
Convention.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War art.
2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC-IV].
38. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the War
on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 8–12 (2006).
39. See Glazier, supra note 25, at 1013.
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 438 [hereinafter
Protocol I].
41. See supra Part II.B. Certain human rights laws and international treaty provisions have
been directly codified into U.S. domestic law, such as the War Crimes Act of 1996 and the
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prescribes the requisite authority and conditions under which
a detaining power may hold individuals in an IAC or NIAC.
B. The President Can Detain Terrorist Adversaries
Under the LOAC Governing IACs and NIACs
Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions serves to
trigger all of the provisions and protections of the conventions during
any armed conflict that arises among nations, regardless if war has
only been declared by one state.42 In conflicts defined as IACs,
Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention confers authority upon a
nation to detain combatants and Article 42 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention grants detention authority over civilians.43 Furthermore,
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
(AP I) prescribes the treatment of detainees in IACs, requiring that
“[a]ny person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the
armed conflict be informed promptly . . . of the reasons why these
measures have been taken.”44 Article 75 of AP I also states that
detainees who have not been captured for penal offences must “be
released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon
as the circumstances justifying the . . . detention . . . have ceased to
exist.”45 Thus, it is evident that during an IAC, a nation state is
entitled to detain a belligerent adversary for so long as the state
deems the belligerent a threat to the nation’s security.
Given that NIACs are typically civil wars waged within a
sovereign nation, the state likely resorts to its domestic legal regime
to punish or detain the insurgent group.46 Thus, only Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (CA3)47 and Additional

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain: Detention of
Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 153–54 (2013).
42. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
GC-I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter GC-II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC-III]; GC-IV, supra note 37, art.3.
43. GC-III, supra note 42, art. 21; GC-IV, supra note 37, art. 42.
44. Protocol I, supra note 40, art 75.
45. Id.
46. Glazier, supra note 25, at 992.
47. GC-I, supra note 42, art. 3; GC-II, supra note 42, art.3; GC-III, supra note 42, art. 3;
GC-IV, supra note 37, art. 3.
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Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP II)48 apply when the
armed conflict takes place in the territory of a single nation and is not
international in nature. CA3 grants basic protections to persons who
are no longer actively participating in hostilities and prohibits,
among other things, “the passage of sentences . . . without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.”49 Articles 4 and 5 of AP II expand on the
protections promulgated by CA3 by setting forth “fundamental
guarantees” similar to those described in Article 75 of AP I.50 Article
6 of AP II also states that “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in
power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to
persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict,
whether they are interned or detained.”51 These provisions rely on
the assumption that the sovereign state retains the authority to punish
or detain a person in a NIAC for any reason related to the conflict,
not just active participation in hostilities.
Thus, under the LOAC governing both IACs and NIACs, the
nation state reserves the right to detain whomever it views as a
threat. Unfortunately, however, the present armed conflict has defied
characterization as either an IAC or NIAC. While the Bush
administration operated on the premise that the “war on terror” was
international in nature such that any terrorist could be deemed a
combatant and subject to preventive detention, the Supreme Court
plurality opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld52 appeared to invoke CA3
to govern what could only be labeled a non-international conflict,
demonstrating the lack of consistency regarding the classification of
this armed conflict.53
As mentioned above, a sovereign state engaged in an IAC
retains authority to capture and detain combatants and civilians
48. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 438
[hereinafter Protocol II].
49. GC-I, supra note 42, art. 3.
50. Protocol I, supra note 40, art. 75; Protocol II, supra note 48, arts. 4–5.
51. Protocol II, supra note 48, art. 6.
52. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
53. Id. at 629–31 (declining to decide whether the conflict would be characterized as an IAC
or a NIAC, yet determining it would be governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions).
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wherever the individual is captured. However, the United States has
not expressly adopted this classification, and has instead adopted an
“overseas contingency operations” approach, in which certain
countries have been officially identified as enemy-occupied
territory.54 Moreover, President Obama has declared that he
will interpret the AUMF in a manner “informed by law of war
principles.”55
Thus, even if the current conflict were characterized as an IAC,
in a situation where a U.S. civilian has been captured domestically
for alleged acts of terrorism, the U.S. would be bound by Article 42
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure that the detention was
“absolutely necessary” to the security of the detaining power.56 This
language warrants an inquiry under domestic law as to the propriety
of the detention, triggering the additional layer of protections
guaranteed by domestic law. Ultimately, classifying the current
conflict as an IAC would not, by itself, resolve the question of
whether indefinite administrative detention is permissible when the
individual purported to be detained is a U.S. citizen who has been
captured away from the theater of war.
Another justification for detaining citizens within the United
States might be established by extending the theater of war to include
the United States. Declaring a state of war within the coterminous
States might be more consistent with a non-international
characterization of the conflict. Furthermore, relying on the fact that
NIACs necessarily invoke domestic law to provide the source of a
sovereign’s detention authority, several high-ranking government
officials would argue that citizen detention is already within the
scope of the president’s Article II war powers.57 On the other hand,
54. See Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting a Supplemental
Appropriations Request for Ongoing Military, Diplomatic, and Intelligence Operations, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 471 (Apr. 9, 2009); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployments of
United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS 833 (June 15, 2009).
55. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative
to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc.
No. 08-0442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum Re Guantánamo Bay], available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
56. GC-IV, supra note 37, art. 42.
57. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
plurality utterly fails to account for the Government’s compelling interests and for our own
institutional inability to weigh competing concerns correctly.”); 157 CONG. REC. S8,045 (daily
ed. Nov. 30, 2011) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“It is not unfair to make an American
citizen account for the fact that they decided to help al-Qaida to kill us all and hold them as long
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others would require significantly more than an invocation of
inherent executive authority to detain citizens without allowing them
access to the courts.58
Therefore, without a clear characterization of the conflict as a
NIAC or IAC, it is uncertain which laws govern detention authority
over citizens on U.S. territory. To make matters more complicated,
the LOAC provisions regarding a belligerent sovereign’s ability to
detain its own citizens are subject to varying interpretations. Some
scholars believe that executive orders of detention in NIACs are
authorized to the same extent as they are in IACs.59 Others would
argue that IAC rules apply when belligerency can be attached to a
party during a NIAC, but otherwise, domestic law and the
protections of human rights law govern.60 In any case, regardless of
whether the conflict is classified as an IAC or NIAC, President
Obama’s statement evidences an intent to rely primarily on domestic
law, calling for an analysis of how the domestic law framework
addresses the issue of the indefinite detention of citizens on
American soil.
C. The President Likely Does Not Have Constitutional or
Statutory Authority to Indefinitely Detain U.S. Citizens
Captured Away from the Theater of War
In light of the Obama administration’s stance that it can only
“analogize” law of war principles to its interpretation and

as it takes to find intelligence about what may be coming next.”); Reply Brief for Appellant at 2,
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-6396) (“It would blink reality to conclude
that the Congress that enacted the AUMF on September 18, 2001, wanted to authorize capture on
a foreign battlefield and detention in the United States, but not capture and detention in the
United States . . . .”).
58. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Hamdi is entitled to a habeas
decree requiring his release unless (1) criminal proceedings are promptly brought, or (2) Congress
has suspended the writ of habeas corpus. . . . [The AUMF] is not remotely a congressional
suspension of the writ, and no one claims that it is.”); id. at 544–45 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[E]ven if history spared us the cautionary example of the internments in
World War II . . . there would be a compelling reason to read § 4001(a) to demand manifest
authority to detain before detention is authorized.”); Memorandum Re Guantánamo Bay, supra
note 56, at 1 (basing the president’s authority to detain persons at Guantánamo on the AUMF).
59. See Robert Chesney, Who May be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens,
52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 796 (2011); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict,
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 50 (2009).
60. See Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of US Practice Relating to ‘Enemy Combatants’, 10 Y.B.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 232, 237–41 (2009).
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implementation of military operations under the AUMF,61 it appears
that the LOAC framework alone does not adequately address the
issue of a sovereign’s power to detain its citizens in a NIAC; thus, it
is necessary to turn the focus inward to domestic law governing
citizen detention during armed conflicts.
Article II of the Constitution declares that “[t]he President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy” and has power
to handle the nation’s foreign affairs and ensure all laws are executed
faithfully.62 The great extent of the president’s foreign affairs power
was described by the Supreme Court in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.63 The president has also been described as the
“sole organ” in international relations, suggesting that the executive
branch is vested with plenary and exclusive war powers.64 Justice
Jackson’s well-known concurring opinion in Youngstown has
influenced the analysis of executive power in times of war and has
since supported the conclusion that any congressional authorization
of the president’s foreign affairs policies places the president in a
zone of maximum power, where his acts warrant minimal judicial
scrutiny.65 Even Congress’s reticence could be interpreted as
acquiescence to an executive mandate.66 Jackson called this the
“zone of twilight” and reasoned that only when the Court determined
the president relied upon his executive authority as
commander-in-chief to accomplish purely domestic objectives could
the judicial branch exert any limitations on the president’s war
powers.67 Finally, Jackson described a third zone, where Congress
61. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on the Obama Administration
and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
139119.htm (addressing the need to translate principles from the laws of war governing IACs to
apply to the current conflict against a nontraditional enemy).
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
63. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
64. Id. at 319–20 (“It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations . . . .”).
65. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
66. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Court interpreted Congress’s
silence towards the president’s political decision to terminate all civil claims against Iranian
parties as acquiescence of the president’s acts. Id. at 678–84.
67. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645–46 (reasoning that the president cannot use “his
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force . . . when it is turned inward, not
because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor”).
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had acted to expressly prohibit presidential action, and where the
judicial branch is capable of higher scrutiny of executive acts, even
those exercised in the name of the president’s war powers.68
To determine whether the president’s detention authority is a
war power exclusive to the executive branch requires an examination
of the history of citizen detention in the United States. The first
notable cases addressing detention of American citizens arose out of
the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II. In
Hirabayashi v. United States,69 the Supreme Court defined the
national government’s war power as one that “is not restricted to the
winning of victories in the field” but “extends to every matter and
activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and
progress . . . .”70 The Court also recognized that this express grant of
power in the Constitution meant that both the president and Congress
must enjoy broad discretion to execute their war powers.71 Noting
that Congress had passed the Act of 194272 ratifying executive orders
that established a curfew for Hirabayashi and other citizens of
Japanese ancestry following the attacks on Pearl Harbor,73 the
Supreme Court found that the legislative and executive branches’
actions fell squarely within the boundaries of the war power,
warranting substantial deference by the judicial branch.74
Drawing on its reasoning in Hirabayashi, the Court
subsequently upheld the constitutionality of the executive orders
mandating the internment of Japanese citizens in Korematsu v.
United States.75 Justice Jackson, one of three vigorous dissenters,
warned that while military orders may last only as long as the
military exigency, judicial construction and approval of such orders
“validated the principle . . . of transplanting American citizens.”76
Jackson understood the inherent danger in permitting a single

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
(1942).
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Id. at 93.
Id.
Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Areas or Zones, Restrictions, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173
Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938–43).
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 91–92.
323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944).
Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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incident to become an enduring principle of law, a doctrine that is
reinforced over time and expanded to cover novel situations.77
Seeking to settle the issue on citizen detention, Congress enacted
the Non-Detention Act nearly thirty years after Korematsu was
decided, to prohibit executive detention of American citizens without
congressional authorization.78 Congress’s intent was clear: to prevent
the president from exceeding his expansive executive power and
once again ordering the detention of American citizens whose
disloyalty or dangerousness had not been verified.79 The
Non-Detention Act repealed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950,
legislation passed during the Red Scare of the Cold War that
permitted the president to declare a state of emergency and order ad
hoc internment of persons who were suspected of engaging in
sabotage or espionage.80 One commentator notes that Congress, by
passing and subsequently repealing legislation dealing with
preventive detention of citizens on U.S. soil, indicated that the
president must not have been considered to already have that
authority, at least during times of peace.81
It is not clear whether Congress intended to include such
detention authority over American citizens detained away from the
theater of war when it passed the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF).82 The AUMF granted the president power to act
against the “nations, organizations, or persons” connected with the
terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11.83 A plurality of the Supreme
77. Id. (“The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”).
78. Non-Detention Act, supra note 23.
79. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718–19 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the
legislative history of the Non-Detention Act supports a reading of the Non-Detention Act as
prohibiting both military and civilian detentions), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also Lindsey O.
Graham & Michael D. Tomatz, NDAA 2012: Congress and Consensus on Enemy Detention, 69
A.F. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013) (noting that though the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s
holding in Padilla for lack of jurisdiction, Justice Stevens’s dissent, joined by three justices,
indicated support for the Second Circuit’s finding that the Non-Detention Act prohibited U.S.
citizen detention without an act of Congress).
80. Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 811, repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85
Stat. 348 (1971).
81. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42337, DETENTION OF U.S. PERSONS
AS ENEMY BELLIGERENTS 30 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42337.pdf
(suggesting that the president might not have held “the constitutional power to declare such
individuals to be enemy combatants subject to detention under the law of war on the basis of an
authorization to use force or declaration of war, except perhaps very narrow circumstances”).
82. AUMF, supra note 7.
83. Id.
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Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld84 interpreted the AUMF’s broad
authorization for the president to take “‘all necessary and appropriate
force’ against ‘nations, organizations, or persons’ associated with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks” as an implicit grant of power
to indefinitely detain enemy combatants regardless of citizenship
status.85
However, Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, did not
address whether the same principles would apply to American
citizens detained in non-battlefield conditions, or if the president has
explicit constitutional authority to classify an American citizen as an
enemy combatant.86 Dissenting from the plurality, Justice Souter,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the unambiguous prohibition
of citizen detention in the Non-Detention Act called for a clear
congressional statement to authorize the internment of American
citizens, wherever they are captured.87 Noting that the AUMF does
not expressly incorporate the word detention, Justice Souter argued
that “there is no reason to think Congress might have perceived any
need to augment Executive power to deal with dangerous citizens
within the United States, given the well-stocked statutory arsenal of
defined criminal offenses covering the gamut of actions that a citizen
sympathetic to terrorists might commit.”88 Scholars have also
weighed in on this issue regarding whether the AUMF would suffice
as a clear congressional statement authorizing citizen detention by
suggesting that government-mandated detention of citizens within
the United States could indeed be considered a violation of the
Non-Detention Act.89 Consequently, whether the AUMF constituted
such an express sanction of citizens captured on American soil is a
question that has yet to be settled.90

84. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
85. Id. at 518–19 (quoting AUMF, supra note 7); Colby P. Horowitz, Note, Creating a More
Meaningful Detention Statute: Lessons Learned from Hedges v. Obama, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2853, 2859–60 (2013).
86. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17.
87. Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 547.
89. See ELSEA, supra note 81, at 36–37; Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown:
Justice Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants”, 68
ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1139–40 (2005).
90. See Robert Chesney, Congress, the Courts, and Detention of Americans under the
AUMF/NDAA, LAWFARE (Dec. 2, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/congr
ess-the-courts-and-detention-of-americans-under-the-aumfndaa/.
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The 2012 version of the NDAA provides some clarification
regarding the detention policies in the current conflict. The NDAA’s
predominant purpose is to allocate funds to the Department of
Defense for the execution of various military activities.91 Buried in
the more than three thousand provisions regulating the fiscal affairs
of the military are two sections implicating civil liberties in the
current conflict.92
In fact, sections 1021 and 1022 constitute the first codification
of executive detention authority during the current conflict.93 Section
1021 mentions “covered persons,” individuals whose activities or
affiliation with terrorist networks could potentially subject them to
indefinite detention without access to courts or lawyers.94 Section
1031, a provision in an earlier Senate version of the NDAA, removed
a limitation on detention for citizens and lawful resident aliens,95
inciting concerns that the NDAA could be read to authorize detention
of Americans without trial or conviction of any charge.96 Statements
made during conference on section 1031 reveal that several senators
fully intended the provision to maximize the president’s war powers
on American soil over American citizens who were deemed a danger
to national security.97

91. It is interesting that Congress decided to include the detention provisions at issue in the
NDAA, given that the statute’s main purpose is to regulate and finance military operations. This
might lend itself to an interpretation of the NDAA’s detention sections as a legislative
afterthought, but the lengthy congressional debate over the provisions and President Obama’s
threatened veto of the entire bill without an amendment of the detention provisions to provide
some protection for citizens indicate that Congress had intended to codify the president’s
detention authority. See NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1 (stating that the statute’s purpose is “to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for military activities of the Department of
Defense . . . .”); see also Recent Legislation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1876 (2012) (discussing the
tension between the legislative and executive branches over certain controversial provisions of
the NDAA, including sections 1021 and 1022).
92. NDAA, supra note 11, at §§ 1021–22.
93. ELSEA, supra note 81, at 1.
94. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1021(b).
95. S. 1253, 112th Cong. § 1031 (as reported by S. Comm. on Armed Services, June 22,
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s1253rs/pdf/BILLS-112s1253rs.pdf
(“[Section 1031] would authorize the [military] to detain unprivileged enemy belligerents
captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the [AUMF].”).
96. See Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 184 & n.83 (2d Cir. 2013).
97. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S7,941 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011) (statement of Sen. Rand
Paul); see also 112 CONG. REC. S8,096–103 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Graham)
(“It has always been the law that when an American citizen takes up arms and joins the enemy,
that is not a criminal act; that is an act of war. They can be held and interrogated about what they
did and what they know because that keeps us safe. If we take that off the table, with homegrown
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Senator Dianne Feinstein’s attempts to safeguard against such an
interpretation resulted in a “compromise amendment” that ultimately
became section 1021(e) of the NDAA.98 Much of the controversy
surrounding 1021(e) arises from the fact that it does not expressly
exempt U.S. citizens from potential indefinite detention, unlike its
sister provision, section 1022. Section 1022 states “detainable
persons are not just detainable in theory, but affirmatively must be
subject to military detention”99 and was amended to exclude U.S.
citizens from mandatory detention.100 In light of such explicit
exemption in section 1022, section 1021(e) could be construed as
“provid[ing] clearer statutory authority to encompass citizens
abroad” or citizens whose combatant status is disputed.101 Section
1021(e) embodied the Senate’s agreement to disagree on whether the
Supreme Court’s narrow decision in Hamdi could be interpreted as
limiting detention without trial to U.S. citizens arrested on a foreign
battlefield or sanctioning a broader authority to detain American
citizens captured domestically.102 The existence of congressional
statements regarding detention of U.S. citizens strongly suggests that
Congress contemplated limits on the president’s constitutional power
in the final version of the NDAA that constrained him from ordering
military detentions of U.S. citizens found on U.S. soil independent of
legislative action.103
Both the AUMF and the NDAA statutes relating to detention are
admittedly vague. The AUMF lacks specificity and commentators
have questioned whether it is still as relevant to the conflict as it was
when it was passed over a decade ago.104 Thus, the NDAA provides
terrorism becoming the greatest threat we face, we will have done something no other Congress
has done in any other war.”).
98. See Hedges, 724 F.3d at 185; 157 CONG. REC. S7,7161, S7,745 (daily ed. Nov. 17,
2011); 157 CONG. REC. S8,094–122, S8,125 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011).
99. Robert Chesney, Does the NDAA Authorize Detention of US Citizens?, LAWFARE
(Dec. 1, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/does-the-ndaa-authorize
-detention-of-us-citizens/.
100. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1022.
101. Robert Chesney, Clarification: NDAA Could Still Be Read to Apply to Citizens Seized
Abroad, LAWFARE (Dec. 9, 2011, 12:34 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/ clarification
-ndaa-could-still-be-read-to-apply-to-citizens-if-seized-abroad/.
102. Hedges, 724 F.3d at 185 (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S8,122 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Feinstein)).
103. See ELSEA, supra note 81, at 37.
104. See Beau D. Barnes, Reauthorizing the “War on Terror”: The Legal and Policy
Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence, 211 MIL. L. REV. 57 (2012); David S. Kris,
Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 64 (2011);
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the most up-to-date assessment on congressional attitudes toward
presidential wartime authority. It prescribes parameters on how and
when the government can detain what it terms “covered persons,” a
neutral term for the now-defunct “enemy combatant” designation.105
With regards to citizens, however, it is silent. Congress’s reticence in
this area is not insignificant; previous congressional acts in the area
of citizen detention support the notion that the president’s
commander-in-chief detention powers are not unlimited.106
Therefore, it would not be inaccurate to surmise that the NDAA
failed to grant the authority necessary to permit the president to
subject citizens suspected of terrorist activities to indefinite
detention.
III. CITIZEN COMBATANT CASES: HAMDI, PADILLA, AND HEDGES
Given that subsection (e) of section 1021 effectively granted the
president no additional authority over the fate of citizens captured on
U.S. territory, it is necessary to determine what previous relevant
cases have held. Unfortunately, there exists little consensus within
the courts as to the limits on the president’s powers over citizens
detained in the current conflict. Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla’s
protracted litigation demonstrate that courts do not hold consistent
views on how and when to defer to congressional and executive
action when it comes to detaining Americans whose terrorist
adversary status is in dispute.
A. Hamdi: The President Is Permitted to Detain
Citizens Captured on a Foreign Battlefield
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen who immigrated to Saudi
Arabia in the early 1980s, was captured on an Afghan battlefield in
2001.107 The government deemed him an “enemy combatant,”
claiming that “this status justifie[d] holding him in the United States
indefinitely[,] without formal charges or proceedings.”108 A plurality
James B. Stein & Miriam R. Estrin, Harmonizing Policy and Principle: A Hybrid Model for
Counterterrorism, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 161, 206 (2014) (recommending that the
AUMF be reviewed to “match the current threats the United States faces against regional
organizations that may have, at best, an attenuated relationship to al Qaeda”).
105. NDAA, supra note 11, at §§ 1021–22; AUMF, supra note 7.
106. See supra Part II.C.
107. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
108. Id. at 510–11.
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of the Court, ignoring the issue of whether the government’s
definition of “enemy combatant” was a legitimate classification in
wartime,109 recognized that Congress, through the AUMF, had
authorized the “use [of] all necessary and appropriate force” against
any party associated with the attacks on 9/11.110 The plurality
concluded that the joint resolution necessarily granted the president
authority to detain individuals labeled “enemy combatants” as “a
fundamental and accepted . . . incident of waging war.”111
Relying on Quirin, the plurality recognized that “[t]here is no
bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy
combatant.”112 The plurality agreed that Hamdi’s citizenship did not
preclude him from being detained as an “enemy combatant,” because
the purpose of such “detention [was] to prevent a combatant’s return
to the battlefield[,]”113 and it was clear that “Hamdi [had been]
captured in a zone of active combat in a theater of war.”114 Justices
Souter and Ginsburg disagreed with the plurality that the AUMF had
authorized detention.115 According to Justice Souter, the AUMF,
which lacked any explicit mention of detention, did not provide the
clear congressional authorization necessary to override the
Non-Detention Act and permit the executive to detain citizens
without charge or trial.116
Upon concluding that Hamdi’s detention as an “enemy
combatant” was authorized, Justice O’Connor applied the
Mathews v. Eldridge117 analysis, what she described as the “ordinary
mechanism [used] . . . to ensure that a citizen is not ‘deprived of life,
liberty, or process without due process of law.’”118 In doing so,
Justice O’Connor helped to define the Court’s role as a safeguard of
fundamental rights. She recognized that Hamdi’s private interest was
a fundamental “interest in being free from physical detention by
one’s own government[,]”119 and that the government’s interest in
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 516–17.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 519.
Id.
Id.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 540–41 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 545–52.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–29 (majority opinion) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 5).
Id. at 539.
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preventing an enemy from returning to the battlefield without the
hindrance and distraction of litigation was a “weighty and sensitive”
justification for limiting judicial review over wartime detentions.120
When weighed against the third prong of the Mathews test, Justice
O’Connor concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation of
Hamdi’s liberty was too high to justify sacrificing the “[n]ation’s
commitment to due process” and the indelible value of American
citizenship.121 She found that a citizen-detainee deserved notice of
the facts used to classify him as an “enemy combatant” and an
opportunity to appear before a neutral decision maker to challenge
those factual allegations.122 Rather than go through a separate
hearing to determine whether he was an “enemy combatant,”
however, Hamdi agreed to renounce his U.S. citizenship and was
repatriated to Saudi Arabia.123
The plurality in Hamdi interpreted the AUMF as granting
authority to the executive to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely as
“enemy combatants,” but agreed that this authorization only applies
in narrow circumstances where the citizen is captured on foreign
battlefields while actively engaged in hostilities against the United
States.124 The Court, thus, did not address the separate issue of
whether citizens detained on American soil can be held indefinitely
as “enemy combatants.”125 It allowed this issue to remain
unanswered by rejecting Hamdi’s companion case, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla,126 for procedural reasons.
B. Padilla: Does the President Actually Have the Authority
to Detain Citizens Arrested on American Soil?
Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen detained on American soil for
allegedly working with al-Qaeda to detonate a “dirty bomb” in the
U.S.,127 spent more than three years detained in a naval brig before

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 531.
Id. at 532–33.
Id.
Tung Yin, Enemies of the State: Rational Classification in the War on Terrorism, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 910 (2007).
124. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510–21.
125. See Hafetz, supra note 6, at 37–38.
126. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
127. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701 (2d Cir. 2003).
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he was transferred into the criminal justice system.128 Padilla’s
capture in the country was crucial to his case. The Second Circuit,
relying on Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown,129 found
that the president “lack[ed] inherent constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief to detain American citizens on American soil
outside a zone of combat.”130 Additionally, the court found that
Congress’s AUMF did not provide the specific congressional
authorization necessary to sanction executive detention of American
citizens on American soil in light of the Non-Detention Act expressly
prohibiting such authority.131
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s
ruling on the basis that Padilla’s claim was procedurally barred for
lack of jurisdiction,132 effectively avoiding “deciding the lawfulness
of a far more expansive use of enemy combatant detention authority”
under the AUMF.133 Padilla refiled his habeas petition in the proper
jurisdiction, and the district court echoed the Second Circuit’s
reasoning that, because Padilla had been detained on American soil,
his capture was not deemed a “necessary and appropriate” measure
under the AUMF.134 The court held that without explicit
congressional authorization to overcome the Non-Detention Act’s
prohibition against detention of U.S. citizens, Padilla could not be
legally detained.135
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s
ruling.136 The court summarily rejected Padilla’s argument that
detention of U.S. citizens required a “clear statement” from Congress

128. Warren Richey, U.S. Turning Over Secret Files to Lawyer for Jose Padilla: What That
Could Mean, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice
/2014/0212/US-turning-over-secret-files-to-lawyer-for-Jose-Padilla-what-that-could-mean.
129. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635–38 (1952).
130. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 712.
131. Id. at 723–24.
132. The Court reversed the Second Circuit’s judgment that Padilla could assert a writ for
habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of New York because only the
district where he was detained had jurisdiction over him. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451
(2004).
133. Hafetz, supra note 6, at 38 (“[The Court’s] rationale eviscerated any meaningful
distinction between detaining a Taliban soldier seized a battlefield in Afghanistan or an alleged
al-Qaeda agent arrested in the United States.”).
134. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686 (D.S.C. 2005).
135. Id. at 685–89.
136. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005).

Spring 2015]

CITIZEN DETENTION

951

according to another WWII internment case, Ex parte Endo,137 in
which the Court stated that it was limited by the clear language of a
wartime statute to find implied executive powers.138 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the Endo Court held that a detention authority
exists, even though the Act of 1942 made no reference to
detention.139 Finally, the circuit court held that even if a clear
statement was required, the AUMF constituted a sufficiently clear
statement where its purpose to prevent future terrorist acts applied
unmistakably to detaining someone like Jose Padilla, who had
allegedly come to the United States intending to commit terrorist
acts.140
Three months later, the government filed criminal charges
against Padilla and requested that the Fourth Circuit vacate its
decision.141 However, the circuit denied the government’s motion,
determining that the issue of whether the AUMF granted the
president power to detain “enemy combatants” on American soil
indefinitely was of “such especial national importance as to warrant
final consideration by [the Supreme C]ourt, even if only by denial of
further review . . . .”142 Indeed, the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
but three Justices would have granted the petition.143 Justice
Ginsburg wrote a dissent, asserting that the question whether “the
President [has] authority to imprison indefinitely a United States
citizen arrested on United States soil distant from a zone of combat
based on an executive declaration that the citizen was . . . ‘an enemy
combatant’” was one “of profound importance to the Nation” that
should have already been addressed.144 The enactment of an explicit
detention provision in the NDAA, however, raised a host of
questions regarding the scope of the president’s detention authority.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

323 U.S. 283 (1944).
Padilla, 423 F.3d at 395.
Id. (quoting Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301 (1944)).
Id. at 395–96.
Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 583.
Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
Id. at 1651 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455 (2004)).
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C. The Hedges Plaintiffs: Can the President Detain Citizens on
American Soil for “Substantially Supporting”
“Associated Forces”?145
Seven notable writers and activists challenged NDAA’s section
1021, claiming that it incorporated broader language as to the
definition of an “enemy combatant.”146 The plaintiffs, Pulitzer
Prize-winning journalist Christopher Hedges and other prominent
U.S. citizens along with foreign political correspondents and activists
whose work linked them to members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
information intimately connected to those terrorist networks, sought
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief from section 1021 on the
grounds that it violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.147
Several plaintiffs expressed fears that their work with organizations
such as WikiLeaks and their support of certain activist associations
could implicate them under section 1021’s military detention
clause.148 They testified that the statutory language was
disconcertingly vague as to whether their work could be construed as
substantially supporting associated forces of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, and that they had significantly curtailed or altered their
usual scope of activities to avoid falling within section 1021’s
reach.149
District court Judge Katherine Forrest agreed that certain terms
in section 1021(b)(2)—“covered person,” “substantially,” and
“directly”—lacked sufficient clarity such that they did not satisfy the
Due Process requirement of notifying an individual of “what conduct
might cause him or her to run afoul of [section] 1021.”150 Thus,
holding that section 1021 was not a mere affirmation of the AUMF,
Judge Forrest ultimately granted plaintiffs’ claims for preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief.151 On appeal, the Second Circuit
vacated Judge Forrest’s permanent injunction of section 1021.152 It
held that the domestic plaintiffs did not establish standing because
145. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1021.
146. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 1721124, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16,
2012).
147. Id.
148. Id. at *6–11.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *23.
151. Id. at *28; Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting
motion for permanent injunction).
152. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013).
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“[s]ection 1021 says nothing at all about the President’s authority to
detain American citizens.”153 The court, therefore, declined to
address the merits of the constitutional claims.154 The Second Circuit
went on to examine the language of the statute to determine if section
1021 actually expanded the executive detention authority.155 Holding
that section 1021(b)(2) merely clarified the AUMF’s previous
authority on detention of organizations,156 the court accepted the
government’s position “that the statute does next to nothing at all”
regarding the president’s detention of U.S. citizens or individuals
captured on U.S. soil.157 The court relied on the legislative history of
section 1021(e), Senator Feinstein’s “compromise amendment,”158 to
determine that it was merely “a ‘truce’ that ensured that—as to those
who are covered by section 1021(e)—courts would decide detention
authority based not on section 1021(b), but on what the law
previously had provided in the absence of that enactment.”159
The Second Circuit engaged in a thorough and accurate statutory
interpretation analysis of section 1021 in the Hedges case to
determine that it was not an expansion of the president’s war
powers.160 The court reached a legally justified result, but deigned to
clarify that the “existing law or authorities” on the subject of citizens
detained on U.S. territory is neither clear nor consistent.161
According to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Padilla, Congress’s
joint resolution to authorize military force subsequently permits the
president to detain citizens regardless of where they are captured.162
This interpretation of the AUMF is not without its critics, since it

153. Id. at 174.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 189.
156. The court came to this conclusion even though the NDAA added language not present in
the AUMF. Id. (“While Section 1021(b)(1) mimics language in the AUMF, Section 1021(b)(2)
adds language absent from the AUMF.”).
157. Id. at 173.
158. Id. at 192.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 182–87, 189–93.
161. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1021(e); see Steve Vladeck, The Problematic NDAA: On
Clear Statements and Non-Battlefield Detention, LAWFARE (Dec. 13, 2011, 12:06 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/the-problematic-ndaa-on-clear-statements-and-non
-battlefield-detention/.
162. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393–94 (4th Cir. 2005).
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appears to contradict Congress’s intent to prohibit citizen detention
on American soil via the Non-Detention Act of 1971.163
Despite the voluminous decisions amassed in the litigation of
the citizen cases, only the Hamdi plurality’s narrow conclusion with
regards to citizens actively engaged in hostilities on foreign
battlefields remains as binding precedent on all courts. The Second
and Fourth Circuits have come to opposite conclusions about
whether the AUMF grants the president the authority to subject
citizens captured on U.S. soil to indefinite military detention.164
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has shied away from deciding what
is the president’s inherent authority to detain citizens arrested on
American soil.165 The lack of settled precedent raises concerns about
how courts will read the AUMF and NDAA to apply it to future
citizen combatant cases that may arise in the current conflict or any
other conflict that takes place outside U.S. borders.
IV. APPLYING THE YOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK AND THE CLEAR
STATEMENT RULE TO EXECUTIVE DETENTION AUTHORITY
In light of the unsettled issue of citizen detention, it is
disappointing that the NDAA failed to clarify the boundaries of the
executive detention authority over citizens captured on American
soil. Congress, faced with President Obama’s threatened veto, ended
the standoff over whether the indefinite detention provision in
section 1021 would extend to U.S. citizens by reaching a
compromise between those senators who wanted to expand detention
of “covered persons” to include citizens captured on American soil
and those who wanted to prohibit such detention.166 Rather than
choose one interpretation over another, Congress punted the issue
over to the judicial referees of statutory interpretation.167 The
inconsistent holdings of the Padilla case in the Second and Fourth
Circuits, however, demonstrate the difficulty that lower courts have
already experienced in attempting to resolve the issue of whether the

163. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 570 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718–24 (2d Cir. 2003).
164. See supra Part III.B.
165. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 570.
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 157 CONG. REC.
S8,122 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)).
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AUMF authorizes indefinite detention of American citizens detained
on American soil.
By refusing to issue a clear statement against indefinite military
detention of citizens, Congress could be viewed as implicitly
endorsing the president’s power to subject citizens to military
detention regardless of whether they have been accurately designated
as a terrorist adversary. Indeed, some senators have vehemently
expressed the viewpoint that nothing stands in the way of terrorists
carrying out future attacks on the coterminous United States,
thrusting the U.S. into the theater of war.168 In particular, Senator
Lindsey Graham’s statements that no U.S. citizen alleged to be a
terrorist adversary could justifiably expect a right to counsel sparked
intense debate on the Senate floor.169
Senator Graham’s assertions, though volatile, subscribe to
long-standing tradition and precedent that establish the president’s
robust authority as commander-in-chief. It is of no moment then, that
even fundamental due process rights are subject to restriction in
times of war.170 However, the internment of Japanese-American
citizens during WWII is a cautionary tale of how rapidly key
constitutional rights can fall to the wayside when a nation is blinded
by fear. The Korematsu decision that upheld the government’s
actions serves as a compelling reminder of when too much judicial
deference to executive authority in times of war yields regrettable
results that are not easily reversed.171 Therefore, war powers must
168. 157 CONG. REC. S7,949 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“Al-Qaida
is at war with us. They brought that war to our shores. This is not just a foreign war. They
brought that war to our shores on 9/11.”); id. at S7,954 (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (“A nation
at war that seizes those who have declared themselves to be part of enemy forces and have
attempted to attack the American people, or America, should be treated as enemy combatants, as
prisoners of war, according to the law of war. To me, that is a matter of principle.”).
169.
If you are an American citizen and you betray your country, you are going to be held in
military custody and . . . [y]ou are not going to be given a lawyer if our national
security interests dictate that you not be given a lawyer and go into the criminal justice
system because we are not fighting a crime, we are fighting a war.
(statement of Sen. Graham).
170. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2007).
171. Forty years would pass before Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi were permitted
to have their cases reopened and their convictions overturned. See Brief for Karen Korematsu, et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2013) (Nos.
12-3176, 12-3644). Nearly fifty years after defending the internment policy in Korematsu, the
Solicitor General issued an official apology for the office’s role in upholding the governmentsanctioned internment of Japanese-American citizens. Neal Katyal, Acting Solicitor General of
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only be exercised commensurate with the exigency and gravity of the
threat. Justice Jackson declared that “the bulwark of liberty in the
Constitution [i]s process.”172 As the interpreters of what process is
due to a particular individual, the judiciary, are the watchmen of this
bulwark, uniquely positioned to sound the alarm the moment a
barrier has been breached.173 Their role becomes more pronounced as
this armed conflict winds down, where excesses of the executive
must be properly curbed and a specter of fear does not continue to
compromise the nation’s most highly coveted asset: the fundamental
civil liberties guaranteed by due process to citizens.174
So what stands in the way of a repeat of the large-scale
derogation of constitutional rights that occurred immediately after
the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in 2001 and the
attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941? Indeed, one might interpret
Congress’s inability to come to a consensus regarding the matter of
citizen detention as a presumption against military detention of
citizens captured within the United States. Conversely, it could also
be construed as a foothold for future executive administrations to
justify the deprivation of physical liberty without due process for a
disfavored group of citizens. President Obama’s signing statement
regarding the NDAA mollified to some extent the concerns that
section 1021 would authorize indefinite military detention of U.S.
citizens away from the theater of war.175 President Obama openly
admitted that he had “serious reservations” about the provisions that
dealt with “detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected
terrorists” but that he simply would not interpret the NDAA as
giving him the authority to detain citizens, even if the AUMF
allowed it.176 One commentator has suggested “codifying such a
view into law could be much more impactful than putting a stamp of

the United States, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the JapaneseAmerican Internment Cases, JUSTICE.GOV (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives
/1346.
172. See Cleveland, supra note 89, at 1135; supra Part II.
173. See Cleveland, supra note 89, at 1135.
174. See id. at 1129.
175. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Dec. 31, 2011).
176. Id.
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approval on the status quo” since the Supreme Court has yet to sign
off on the Obama administration’s stance on detention authority.177
That an outgoing commander-in-chief’s interpretation of
deliberately ambiguous statutory language serves as the only
safeguard of citizens’ right to be free from detention is an unsettling
notion, one that has prompted several states, cities, and counties
across the United States to codify laws opposing the enforcement of
section 1021.178 Moreover, the 2013 and 2014 versions of the NDAA
have preserved section 1021 in its entirety, though other provisions
have been amended to reflect shifting priorities in the Obama
administration’s wartime agenda.179 It seems as though section 1021,
despite its shortcomings, is here to stay.
Given the unsettled issue of detention authority, it is imperative
to determine what, if anything, courts are empowered to do should
they face another Hedges or Padilla case. Absent any compelling
national emergency and the overhaul of domestic criminal law, U.S.
citizens have a legitimate interest to be free from unjustified military
detention without trial proceedings when it has not been established
that they are terrorists. The constitutional guarantees in the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, “[f]reedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms
of physical restraint,”180 and the hard lesson learned from Korematsu
render the issue of citizen detention one that warrants analysis under
the Youngstown framework and the clear statement rule.
Applying the Youngstown continuum of presidential power to
the executive’s authority to detain civilians arrested on American soil
gives courts an indication of the level of judicial deference to afford
to executive actions. This Article asserts that with regard to citizen
detention, the president has not been granted express congressional
177. Benjamin Wittes, Raha Wala Writes His Own FAQ, LAWFARE (Dec. 20, 2011, 10:01
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/raha-wala-writes-his-own-faq/#more-4430.
178. Allie Bohm, One Thing Maine, Virginia and Arizona Have in Common: Opposition to
the NDAA, ACLUBLOG (Apr. 27, 2012, 10:46 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national
-security/one-thing-maine-virginia-and-arizona-have-common-opposition-ndaa (noting that
Virginia and Maine have passed legislation calling for the repeal of the NDAA’s detention
provisions).
179. The provision governing the closure of Guantanamo Bay was updated in the 2014
version of the NDAA, while the provision regarding indefinite military detention of citizens has
yet to be reformed. Natasha Lennard, Obama Signs NDAA 2014, Indefinite Detention Remains,
SALON (Dec. 27, 2013 04:38 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/27/obama_signs_ndaa_2014_i
ndefinite_detention_remains/.
180. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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authorization under the AUMF or NDAA to detain citizens found
away from the theater of war. Reviewing Congress’s actions with a
historical lens provides insight as to how the legislature regarded the
power to detain U.S. citizens. During World War II, President
Roosevelt issued proclamations under the Alien Enemy Act ordering
the internment of “aliens” deemed likely to commit espionage or
other hostile acts.181 When the president sought to include citizens,
however, the executive order referring to citizen internment
“appeared to rely on the nation’s war powers directly,” and not the
Alien Enemy Act.182 Apparently, at that time, even “the War
Department felt congressional authorization was necessary to
provide authority for its enforcement.”183 Congress eventually passed
legislation during the Cold War granting the president the power to
detain citizens, a power it would invalidate twenty years later with
the Non-Detention Act.184
One could deduce from this series of legislative actions that
Congress contemplated that the legislature, and not the executive,
had the authority to make decisions regarding citizens’ liberty in the
homeland. Though the Hamdi plurality declined to address whether
the Non-Detention Act should apply to armed conflicts, Justice
Souter’s reasoning that the Non-Detention Act still shielded citizens
from detention without an explicit act of Congress to the contrary
finds support in the history of the congressional actions that
sanctioned and subsequently prohibited citizen detention. And while
the canon of constitutional avoidance might call for a reading of the
Non-Detention Act that upholds the constitutionality of the AUMF—
for example, that the Non-Detention Act only applies to civilian
detention—the legislative intent of the Non-Detention Act would
belie such an interpretation.185 Both supporters and opponents of the
Non-Detention Act understood it to be a prohibition on all detentions
by the executive branch, including both military and non-military
detentions.186
181. ELSEA, supra note 81, at 28.
182. Id. at 38.
183. Id. at 29.
184. Id. at 34–37.
185. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718–19 (2d Cir. 2003).
186. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 547 (2004) (“Representative Ichord, chairman of the
House Internal Security Committee and an opponent of the bill, feared that the redrafted statute
would ‘deprive the President of his emergency powers and his most effective means of coping
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Thus, this Article suggests that the president is most likely
situated somewhere within the zone of twilight, where congressional
authorization of executive mandated detention of citizens captured
on American soil is ambiguous at best, or in the third zone of
presidential power, where executive powers are at their lowest. In
these zones, courts are better able to counterbalance the executive
branch to provide the judicial oversight that is necessary in situations
where civil liberties are at stake. Moreover, both spheres permit
courts to exercise broader discretion to scrutinize the president’s
actions and to engage in meaningful balancing of the government
and individual’s interests.
However, courts might find the president to be acting with
congressional authorization where Congress acted by issuing a broad
authorization of force and codifying whatever detention authority,
placing him firmly in the zone where his executive powers are at
their maximum. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Padilla supports this
conclusion, given its reasoning that the AUMF authorized President
Bush’s decision to hold Padilla incommunicado for over three
years.187 In this zone of nearly unchecked executive war power, the
concern that a future president could hold citizens indefinitely
without charge or trial is not unfounded. Yet if a court were to
determine the AUMF and NDAA adequately constitute the act of
Congress required by the Non-Detention Act to rebut the prohibition
on citizen detention, it should not end its judicial inquiry there.
Courts have afforded great deference to executive actions in this
war—and with good reason, some national security scholars
argue188—but others would point out that this principle of limited
judicial oversight cannot be reconciled in light of the separation of
powers goal of safeguarding individual rights.189
with sabotage and espionage agents in war-related crises.’ 117 CONG. REC., at 31,542.
Representative Railsback, the bill’s sponsor, spoke of the bill in absolute terms: ‘[I]n order to
prohibit arbitrary executive action, [the bill] assures that no detention of citizens can be
undertaken by the Executive without the prior consent of the Congress.’ Id., at 31,551.”).
187. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390–92 (4th Cir. 2005).
188. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 16 (2007) (“The real cause of deference to government in times of
emergency is institutional: both Congress and the judiciary defer to the executive during
emergencies because of the executive’s institutional advantages in speed, secrecy, and
decisiveness.”).
189. See David Cole, No Reason To Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and
Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (2008) (“Precisely because we rely so
heavily on the executive to maintain our security, we should be skeptical of its ability to give
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In the matter of citizen detention, it is especially incumbent
upon “the judiciary [to] be a full player in the separation of powers
framework,”190 while still preserving the proper balance of powers
among the three branches. The government has already recognized
that American citizenship of an alleged terrorist adversary warrants
some minimal form of “special treatment.”191 As it stands now, the
legislature has not come to a consensus on how expansive it
considers the executive detention authority over citizens. Given the
indeterminate state of the law, it is up to the judiciary to take on an
active role that yields constitutionally consistent results without
encroaching upon the executive’s unique ability to make swift
decisions concerning matters of military judgment.192 Thus, this
Article suggests that courts should find that without a clear statement
to the contrary, the AUMF and NDAA do not authorize the
Executive to order the indefinite detention of citizens who are not
terrorist adversaries or whose adversary status is in dispute.
The clear statement rule requires a “‘clear statement’ on the face
of the statute to rebut a policy” that the Court presumes Congress
intended to implement by enacting a particular statute.193 Legal
scholars note that courts might resist the application of a clear
statement rule to the AUMF and the NDAA in light of the
well-established presumption against interpreting statutes as
interfering with or derogating the president’s foreign affairs
powers.194 However, when the statute in question is susceptible to
interpretations that implicate the constitutional rights of individuals,
there is a compelling need to apply a clear statement rule to ensure
civil liberties are not unjustifiably diminished.
Scholars arguing that the clear statement rule should be used in
interpreting the AUMF have disagreed on what circumstances trigger
sufficient weight to the liberty side of the balance.”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference,
69 MO. L. REV. 903, 929 (2004).
190. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 884 (2013).
191. Hope Metcalf & Judith Resnik, Gideon at Guantánamo: Democratic and Despotic
Detention, 122 YALE L.J. 2504, 2527 (2013).
192. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech at Northwestern University School of Law
(Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech
-1203051.html.
193. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 n.4 (1992).
194. See id. at 606; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2104 & n. 259 (2005).
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its application. Some scholars reason that U.S. citizens detained on
U.S. territory beyond the theater of war, regardless of their military
designation, should invoke the clear statement rule,195 while others
assert that the rule should only be triggered when the president is
acting against noncombatants in the United States.196 Those that
claim that a clear statement rule should be required whenever
citizens are arrested in the United States cite the Non-Detention
Act.197 While the premise is reasonable, the rule, as applied, would
interfere with generally accepted wartime practices. Even when
appropriately engaging in scrutiny of executive military decisions,
courts cannot, by their actions, supersede or substitute their
judgments for the commander-in-chief’s wartime decision-making
authority.198 Allowing a clear statement rule for any American
citizen who concedes adversary status would be counterproductive to
the war effort, and thus too broad.
On the other hand, other scholars would limit the application of
a clear statement requirement on the basis of combatant status.199
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith reason that a long history of
detaining combatants and an analysis of the international laws of war
provide strong support that the AUMF “need not specify all
approved presidential wartime actions.”200 They argue that when
“presidential action involves a traditional wartime function exercised
by the president against an acknowledged enemy combatant,” the
president’s inherent powers as commander-in-chief and interest in
protecting the national security outweigh the liberty interest of the
alleged terrorist adversary.201
Therefore, Bradley and Goldsmith assert that the clear statement
rule should only be triggered when the president acts to detain
American citizens who are noncombatants.202 Their approach
accounts for the fact that the United States is still actively engaged in
war against enemy forces that would traditionally receive lesser
195. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 170, at 2074.
196. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 194, at 2106.
197. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 170, at 2074.
198. See Daniel Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1006 (1999) (“[T]he Court often contrasts the expertise of the
officials under review to its own generalist and uninformed nature.”).
199. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 194, at 2055–56.
200. Id. at 2054–55.
201. Id. at 2105.
202. Id. at 2106.
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protections under the LOAC than under the state’s domestic criminal
law. Under the LOAC, a belligerent sovereign is entitled to deem
individuals terrorist adversaries and administratively detain them, so
Bradley and Goldsmith’s clear statement configuration affords
appropriate deference to the commander-in-chief to immobilize those
American citizens who pose genuine threats to national security.
However, their suggestion requires ignoring the reality that the
government’s process of designating combatants in this armed
conflict has not always resulted in detention conditions that conform
to LOAC and human rights law standards.203 Additionally, one
commentator points out that basing the clear statement solely upon
combatant status would result in a displacement of civilian law with
martial law within the United States, where there is no compelling
reason to do so absent battlefield conditions.204
Another approach would be to use a clear statement rule in cases
where the combatant status of the citizen detainee is disputed. One
concern with this approach is that courts would have to initially
adjudicate the propriety of a detainee’s combatant designation before
determining whether a clear statement would apply. The
government’s heightened interest in protectionism and national
security might create a perverse incentive by which the government,
to avoid triggering the clear statement rule, would be motivated to
make unconfirmed allegations about individual detainees in order to
label them suspected terrorist adversaries.205 This would essentially
force courts to undertake statutory interpretation issues about
military terms, such as “belligerent act” and “associated force,”
concerns found in section 1021 that were not defined in the statute,206
and to participate in factual inquiries that might be better handled by
martial law experts.
The concern that courts might face difficulties in determining
whether the citizen’s combatant status is genuinely in dispute,
however, does not outweigh the need to first adjudicate whether
203. See supra Part II.A–B.
204. See Sarah Erickson-Muschko, Beyond Individual Status: The Clear Statement Rule and
the Scope of the AUMF Detention Authority in the United States, 101 GEO. L.J. 1399, 1420–21
(2013).
205. See generally id. (arguing that location of capture, regardless of combatant or
citizenship, should drive application of the clear statement rule to the AUMF and NDAA).
206. Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (expressing frustration
with the government’s evasiveness when asked to define the terms at issue).
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indefinite detention is the most appropriate method to deal with a
citizen alleged to be a combatant. Where civilian law has yet to be
supplanted by martial law in the United States, constitutional rights
asserted on American soil exist to their fullest extent. Additionally,
the act of detaining a belligerent’s own citizen within the
belligerent’s territory is a practice consistently used in civil wars.207
In this scenario, the nation’s own domestic law and all of its
fundamental constitutional guarantees would duly kick in.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article proposes that courts should apply a clear statement
rule to the AUMF and NDAA that is triggered when United States
citizens, whose combatant status is in dispute, are arrested, captured,
or detained on American soil.208 This approach attempts to reconcile
the existence of explicit congressional prohibition of citizen
detention with the practical realities of a nation still engaged in
military conflict.209 Using the clear statement rule places a thumb on
the scale towards congressional intent, a more appropriate alternative
to the presidential hand that has become a near-permanent fixture on
the scale. A clear statement rule also acknowledges that Congress
has historically legislated in the area of citizen detention during times
of peace, and thus, appropriate in this winding down period of the
current armed conflict. It also permits the judiciary to maintain some
oversight of executive actions.
Applying a clear statement requirement to the AUMF and
NDAA would accomplish several important purposes. First, it would
207. See, e.g., Letter from Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, to Winfield Scott, U.S.
Lieutenant Gen. (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 347, 347
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (authorizing General Winfield Scott to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus to assist in “repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States”); see
generally Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009)
(discussing moments in history when the president suspended the writ of habeas corpus in times
of national emergency).
208. Here, the trigger for a clear statement makes an explicit distinction between United
States citizens and legal permanent residents detained in the United States, given that the text of
the Non-Detention Act specifically and exclusively prohibits detention of American citizens
absent congressional action.
209. Courts have applied civilian and military law principles in tandem to justify the
indefinite detention of the few so-called combatants who were encountered at and away from the
battlefield. See supra Part IV. Moreover, the Bush and Obama administrations, to varying
degrees, couched their wartime rhetoric in traditional LOAC terms and principles. See supra Part
II.A–B.
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likely function as a preliminary stopgap measure against ongoing
detention without trial or access to lawyers for citizens like Jose
Padilla, whose U.S. citizenship and presence on American soil
necessarily warranted more due process protections under the Fifth
Amendment than were initially provided. When a court receives a
next-friend habeas petition on the citizen’s behalf, challenging the
indefinite detention of the citizen, it need not find statutory
authorization under the AUMF and NDAA for the citizen’s
continued detention. Instead, the court could determine that even
under the Youngstown framework, the president’s actions are not
authorized by Congress, and therefore subject to judicial correction.
In doing so, the court would be permitted flexibility in resolving the
matter and could potentially choose to follow the lead of the district
court that received Yaser Hamdi’s next-friend petition and appointed
Hamdi unmonitored access to legal counsel.210
Additionally, this Article also suggests that a clear statement
rule balances the separation of powers principle of political
accountability against the principle of preserving individual rights.
Proponents of judicial deference to executive action assert the nature
of the presidency as most amenable to the nation’s constituents;211
this rationale is just as apposite for the legislature.212 In fact, because
legislators are accountable to a different political constituency than
the executive, when both political branches act in concert, this
bilateral institutional endorsement of the government’s actions
provides more support for what Justice Jackson imagined would be a
legitimate justification for courts to take a backseat when reviewing
exercises of executive war power.
Moreover, because Congress generally cannot issue legislation
with a high degree of specificity, “[c]ourts therefore will have a good
deal of interpretive latitude to decide whether the congressional
legislation is ‘close enough’ to be treated as effective endorsement of

210. Order at 14–15, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02cv439 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2002).
211. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010) (discussing the executive’s unique role to govern in crises).
212. See Deeks, supra note 190, at 882–83; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between
Civil Libertarianism And Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach To Rights
During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 17 (2004); Joseph Landau, Muscular
Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 689
n.136 (2009).
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the disputed executive action.”213 Courts are free to engage in some
review, acting as a backseat driver of sorts. Thus, the due process test
promulgated in Mathews v. Eldridge214 constrains the executive and
legislative branch from unjustifiably depriving citizen detainees of
their constitutional rights. The Mathews analysis ensures that the
court makes a case-by-case determination of whether any risk of
erroneous deprivation is too high to warrant the detention of an
allegedly dangerous individual.
What makes the Mathews analysis a vital companion to the clear
statement rule is that it “is unaltered by the allegations surrounding
the particular detainee or the organizations with which he is alleged
to have associated.”215 Justice O’Connor determined in Hamdi that
regardless of the veracity of the government’s allegations that Hamdi
was an “enemy combatant,” his right to access counsel during his
proceedings on remand was undeniable.216 Thus, courts are able to
focus upon the constitutionality of the procedures afforded to the
individual citizen detainee without engaging in impermissible
judicial review that impinges upon the executive’s expansive Article
II powers. Regardless of where the court deems the president is
situated along the Youngstown continuum of power, it is entitled to
evaluate the accused’s due process rights in relation to whatever
compelling interest the government may put forth. Thus, the
Mathews analysis preserves the balance between all three branches
of government while seeking to ensure the individual citizen’s rights
have not been unjustifiably derogated.
Courts would also enjoy greater latitude to construe the
provisions in section 1021 as providing citizen detainees with the
options presented in sections 1021(c)(3)–(4), transfer to an
appropriate alternative court with jurisdiction or repatriation to the
person’s native country.217 Therefore, requiring courts to utilize a
clear statement rule to the AUMF and the NDAA is paramount to

213. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 212, at 38 (“[C]ongressional legislation as there is will
often be cast at a high level of generality. Only rarely will Congress have focused in an exact way
on the precise assertion of executive authority at issue; more typically, Congress will have
legislated, if at all, in more general terms, in contexts not exactly those in which the executive
currently seeks to act.”).
214. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
215. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004).
216. Id. at 539.
217. NDAA, supra note 11, § 1021(c)(1)–(4), 125 Stat. 1562 (2011).
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holding the president accountable when he seeks to significantly
curtail liberties of U.S. citizens who have yet to be conclusively
deemed terrorist adversaries.
Finally, this Article suggests a simple revision of section
1021(e) of the NDAA to include clearer language exempting citizens
captured domestically from its reach. Section 1022(b) is an example
of what the revision might look like; it includes unambiguous
language that expressly exempts citizens from mandatory military
detention.218 The provision is titled “Applicability to United States
Citizens and Lawful Resident Aliens” and exempts citizens from
mandatory military detention in subsection (1), as well as lawful
resident aliens, to the extent permissible by the Constitution, in
subsection (2).219 Thus, Congress should amend section 1021(e) to
expressly prohibit the application of section 1021(b)–(d) to U.S.
citizens captured on U.S. soil, and to permit detention of lawful
resident aliens only to the extent allowable under the Constitution.
The section 1021(e) language should be revised as follows:
(e) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the
detention of lawful resident aliens of the United States or
any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United
States.
(1) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS.
—Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the
detention of United States citizens captured or arrested in
the United States.
This long overdue revision would quell the fears that the Hedges
group voiced and satisfy the growing number of petitions opposing
the detention statute. It would also eliminate the need for Congress to
clarify the meaning of terms like “substantially supported” and
“associated forces,” which the Hedges plaintiffs claimed were
impermissibly vague. This is no small matter. The task of defining
these technical terms is arguably beyond the scope of the
legislature’s powers and is more appropriately entrusted to the
executive branch, given that both the judiciary and Congress have
traditionally deferred to the executive’s expertise in military
218. Id. § 1022(b) (“The requirement to detain a person in military custody under this section
does not extend to citizens of the United States.”).
219. Id. § 1022(b)(1)–(2).
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affairs.220 Still, the fact that the 2013 and 2014 versions of the
NDAA have been approved without any further revision to section
1021 makes it clear that there is little likelihood of success of
amending the provision. Therefore, it is largely the responsibility of
the courts to ensure the application of a clear statement rule to
section 1021 of the NDAA in order to prevent the indefinite
detention of American citizens on American soil without due
process.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this unique issue where domestic and international law
converge, courts must step up to the challenge of preserving the
delicate balance between the three separate branches of government.
This balance is the most compelling and enduring characteristic of
the American Constitution. Justice O’Connor, writing for the Hamdi
plurality, stated “[w]hatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake.”221 Therefore, permitting courts to step in when elemental civil
liberties hang in the balance is not only prudent, it is necessary to
sustain the balanced power dynamic of the U.S. government.
Applying tools like the clear statement requirement and the Mathews
calculus to individual cases reaffirms the judiciary’s commitment to
ensure the bedrock of liberty—constitutional due process—is not
chipped away in the name of national security. History is a powerful
reminder that a nation gripped with fear can leave indelible, almost
irreversible scars upon its citizens. Thus, it is of utmost importance
that courts do not flout the lessons of the past, but treat history as a
guidepost to uphold the basic, fundamental rights of American
citizens in the face of the novel challenges that characterize this “war
on terror.”

220. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 188, at 16 (“The real cause of deference to
government in times of emergency is institutional: both Congress and the judiciary defer to the
executive during emergencies because of the executive's institutional advantages in speed,
secrecy, and decisiveness.”).
221. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
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